The Journal of South Asian Non-Proliferation

Volume 1 Issue 1

June 1, 2007

Editorial Staff
Maria Sultan, Editor-in-Chief
Jack Boureston,(FirstWatch International) Contributing Editor
Bharath G, Research Analyst
Nick Robson, Production Support

Supporting worldwide understanding of South Asian non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues.

The Journal of South Asian Non-Proliferation
is a Product of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)

CONTENTS 

Special Features
Another Step in From the Cold
Launch Into the Ivy-League

NUCLEAR RELATED ISSUES
Administration Moves to Expedite Indian Nuclear Talks
India Stance Threatens US Nuclear Deal
India to Informally Present case at Crucial NSG Meet
India's list of Demands may Scuttle Nuclear Deal: U.S. Daily
Indian Envoy says 123 Talks not in Trouble
Khan nuclear network was beyond state control
Pakistan: Khan Nuclear Network Beyond State Control
Pakistan says Danger of Nuclear Weapons use as High Today as During Cold War
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan
US Fears Pak May be Approached for "Sunni Bomb"
US let Pakistan go nuclear: ex-CIA official
Khan nuclear network was beyond state control

MISSILE RELATED ISSUES
India Tests Missile Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead to Beijing
Launch into the Ivy-League
Missile Envy
Next Objective: a 5,000-km Agni
Pakistan preparing to deploy new N-missile: report
US Advises Caution after Agni Test

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RELATED ISSUES
The 2006 BWC Review Conference, The Presidents Reflection

GENERAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES
In Search of an Indian Security Strategy
It's Time to Rewrite an Outdated Treaty
Pakistan key Strategic Partner for UK: Lyall Grant
Pak-US Relations Head for Hard Time
The World's Growing Nuclear Club: India Can Offer Some Lessons on Non-Proliferation in a New Nuclear Age

SUMMARIES

Another Step in From the Cold, Anne Charlotte Wetterwik, Op-ed, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London, May, 2007. The author examine the recent strides made by Pakistan in its export control policies. The author also highlights the steps that Pakistan has taken to further strengthen its national export control system and how it would address the questions regarding non-proliferations. The article also highlights Pakistan’s commitment to non-proliferation and international security.

Launch into the Ivy-League, Bharath G. Pant H. and Boureston J., op-ed, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London, May 2007. The authors state that India has consistently used information from its commercial space program to benefit its missile program. However, organizational and functional bureaucracies have plagued Indian missile development. According to the authors, India's recent test demonstrates its lack of a clear and cohesive planning for strategic missions.

Administration Moves to Expedite Indian Nuclear Talks Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, April 20, 2007. On April 20, 2007, U.S. officials, frustrated by the pace of negotiation on the India civil nuclear deal, want the Indian government to push the deal through next month before the initiative collapses. President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh initially agreed to an implementation plan in March 2006 and now are negotiating language to comply with a U.S. congressional bill that was passed last year.

India to Informally Present Case at Crucial NSG Meet Rediff, April 16, 2007. On April 16, 2007, Rediff reported that during the upcoming Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting, India would informally present its case to the group for joining it as a member. Though the Indo-U.S. civil deal is not part of the official agenda, the issue is likely to be discussed informally. India has sent High Commissioner to Singapore S. Jaishankar, who has been involved in prior negotiations on the Indo-U.S. deal, to speak on India's behalf.

India Stance Threatens US Nuclear Deal Edward Luce, Financial Times, April 19, 2007. On April 19, 2007, the Financial Times reported that the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal has run into serious difficulties with New Delhi pressuring the U.S. to rewrite certain aspects of a law enacted by Congress last year. According to Financial Times sources, Indian negotiators are contesting a clause in the law that would withdraw civil nuclear fuel supplies if India breached its moratorium on further nuclear testing. India’s Department of Atomic Energy scientists claim that India needs to retain the right to continue nuclear testing. In addition, Indian officials believe that it is important to grant India the same reprocessing rights that have been developed in the EU, Japan, and Switzerland. .

Indian Envoy Says 123 Talks Not in Trouble Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Hindustan Times , April 4, 2007. Although there is some speculation that the 123 agreement might be in trouble, India’s Ambassador to the U.S., Ronen Sen is not pessimistic about its eventual success. However, Ambassador Sen did note that the process would be long, as India has thus far completed only two of the five stages needed to finalize the agreement.

India’s List of Demands May Scuttle Nuclear Deal: U.S. Daily Indo-Asian News Service, Hindustan Times, April 13, 2007. On April 13, 2007, the Hindustan Times reported the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal is at risk of collapse due to India’s demands to continue testing nuclear weapons. While the U.S. Congress believed that the deal would help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to avert an arms race, the U.S. must examine India’s demands: 1) permission to buy uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing technology, 2) no limits on nuclear testing, and 3) U.S. approval to reprocess used nuclear fuel from power plants. Non-proliferation expert Robert Einhorn stated that India may want the deal to fall through to shield India from competition with foreign contractors.

Khan nuclear network was beyond state control Dawn, May 09, 2007. On May 09, 2007 Dawn reported on the strategic assessment launched by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), a London based think tank. The document suggests that there is no evidence that Pakistan allowed A.Q. Khan's network to sell nuclear technology to fund its nuclear program. It also stated that there was never any suggestion that Dr. Khan ever met Al-Qaeda leaders, nor there was there evidence of links between Khan network and the Al-Qaeda. Finally, the assessment added that Pakistan had established "a very strong" command and control system and Pakistani officials had done a good job in explaining its system to international observers in Washington and Brussels.

       Pakistan: Khan Nuclear Network Beyond State Control ADNKRONOS International, May 20, 2007.  The ADKRONOS reported about Mark Fitzpatrick's dossier on the A. Q. Khan    network. Although his dossier observed that Khan's transactions were beyond state control, he identified certain grey areas. He identified that certain "past governments" had knowledge of Khan's activities. He also added that the former army chief Gen. Aslam Beg "encouraged" the Khan network's sales to other countries. "Ego, money, nationalism and a sense of Islamic fraternity" motivated Khan and his supporters to sell nuclear technology to other Muslim countries, he said. "Different motivations in different cases."

    Pakistan Says Danger of Nuclear Weapons Use as High Today as During Cold War Associated Press of Pakistan, April 11, 2007.On April 11, 2007, Pakistan's U.N. Ambassador Munir Akram stated that the consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation has broken down. Akram cited negative developments such as reluctance on the part of original nuclear weapons states to foreswear nuclear weapons and development of nuclear weapons by new states. In addition, Akram stated that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has no realistic prospect of coming into force.

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan   Abdul Manna, The Henry L. Stimson Center , April 2007. In April 2007, Abdul Mannan, member of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, attempted to assess Pakistan's response to nuclear terrorism through a hypothetical case study of sabotage on radioactive consignments. The consequences were gauged using the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC). The study concluded that Pakistan's controls around nuclear installations and radiation facilities are sufficient to deter or delay a terrorist attack.

US Fears Pak May be Approached for Sunni Bomb :Report   The Times of India, April 15, 2007. On April 15, 2007, President Bush expressed concern that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Middle East states may turn to Pakistan to help create a "Sunni bomb." Both Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East expert at the Nixon Center , expressed apprehension over the consequences of Iran's nuclear program and the possibility of counter-reactions by states, including conventional military build-ups or examination of nuclear options as a catalyst for an arms race.

       US let Pakistan go nuclear: ex-CIA official   Dawn , May 04, 2007,  On May 04, 2007 the Dawn reported that the Reagan administration permitted Pakistan to continue its nuclear program because it needed Pakistani support to fight the Russians in Afghanistan. According to Mr. Andrew Barlow, an ex-CIA official and Pakistan expert, the US intentionally chose to ignore the efforts of Pakistan's to develop a nuclear weapon. He also added that Reagan wanted military and economic aid to continue flowing to Pakistan to ensure its ongoing support.

      India Tests Missile Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead to Beijing International News, April 12, 2007. On April 12, 2007, International News reported that India successfull launched a ballistic missile (Agni-III, intermediate range ballistic missile: solid fuel, two stage, range 3500km--payload 1500kg) capable of carrying nuclear warheads to much of Asia and the Middle East. While India began developing the missile when relations with China were cooler than they currently are, former head of Defence Studies and Analysis Uday Bhaskar stated that the test should not be seen as an offensive threat against China or Pakistan.

Missile Envy   C Raja Mohan, International Relations and Security Network, April 16, 2007. With the successful launch of India's Agni -III missile, India has started to close its missile technology gap with China. While India's main objective in developing the Agni -III was to establish a credible form of deterrence vis-a-vis China, the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) believes that India and China will not engage in an arms race due to their economic interdependence and China's advanced missile delivery systems.

US Advises Caution After Agni Test India Post, April 16, 2007. On April 16, 2007, the India Post reported that the U.S. reacted cautiously to India's Agni -III test-firing (intermediate range ballistic missile: solid fuel, two stage, range 3500km--payload 1500kg). U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack stated that India is attempting to reshape the nature of its relationship with the rest of the world vis-a-vis its nuclear program, which the U.S. and India are currently negotiating.

      Next Objective: a 5,000-km Agni T. S. Subramanian, Interview with Avinash Chander , Programme Director, Agni-III mission, Frontline, Apr 21-May 4, 2007, Avinash Chander, Director of the Advanced Systems Laboratory, and Programme Director for the Agni-III mission explains the reasons for the need for Agni -III as a strategic nuclear deterrent. He describes the recent Agni -III test as a "perfect success". Chander also explains the reasons for the failure of the Agni-III launch in 2006 and how quickly DRDO has learned from its failures. Finally, he described India's position in missile capability among nations such as Russia, the United States, France and China, and also India's future path towards acquiring an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).

Pakistan preparing to deploy new N-missile: report   Anwar Iqbal, Dawn, May 10, 2007, On May 09, 2007, Dawn reported that Pakistan is
preparing to deploy its next-generation of nuclear-capable ballistic missile. This news was based on a report by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The FAS acknowledges that "the main driver for Pakistan's nuclear modernization appears to be India's nuclear build-up, although national prestige probably is also a factor." It also underlines the fact that the two countries appear to be entering a new phase in their regional arms race with medium-range ballistic missile slowly replacing aircraft as the backbone of their nuclear strike forces.

The 2006 BWC Review Conference, The Presidents Reflection Masood Khan, The Acronym Institute, Spring 2007. Masood Khan reflects on the successes of the Sixth Biological     and Toxin Weapons Review Conference, held from November 20, 2006 to December 8, 2006. Mr. Khan is Pakistan's permanent representative to the United Nations. He was also President of the Conference during that session. Some successes included agreement on an agenda, early circulation of state parties' proposals, and the U.S. and Iran's concurrence on specific points. Khan expressed confidence that agreements reached during the Sixth Review Conference will significantly reduce the risk posed by biological weapons in the future.

      In Search of an Indian Security Strategy K. Subrahmanyam, The Indian Express, April 10, 2007. According to K. Subrahmanyam, India's credible minimum deterrence should be derived from future enemies' security doctrines, their stockpiles, and India's policy as an emerging power. With the Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) looming, the ability to allow India's deterrence strategy to change with future policy will be threatened. Even with talk of the 123 treaty and FMCT, India has yet to lay out alternative plans to meet any future risks. This action must take place in order for India to assess the current situation and look to the future.

      It's Time to Rewrite an Outdated Treaty   Humphrey Hawksley, International Herald Tribune , April 18, 2007. According to Ed Hawkley , the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be rewritten to be more acceptable to nations who feel that it is outdated or unfair. In Hawkley's view, the revision should accommodate nations such as India and Pakistan, which have declared their nuclear programs but have not signed the NPT, and North Korea, which was a signatory in the past; it may be that the current treaty is too "hit and miss." In generations to come, the pace at which countries will need to find alternative energy sources and announce building of uranium-enrichment facilities will become a focal point for a new treaty.

      Pak-US Relations Head for Hard Time Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, The International News , April 19, 2007. On April 19, 2007, International News reported that political ties between Pakistan and the U.S. are declining with the failure to schedule the Pakistan-U.S. Defence Consultative Group meeting. Highly placed diplomats informed International News that the emerging pattern of the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan will enhance U.S. relations with India.

      Pakistan Key Strategic Partner for UK: Lyall Grant   Pal Tribune, April 18, 2007. On April 19, 2007, British High Commissioner to Pakistan Sir Mark Lyall Grant described Pakistan as a strategic partner for the U.K. Grant further stated that both countries' governments work closely together during meetings of the Joint Working Groups on Counter-Terrorism, and that the struggles of terrorism, proliferation, and migration are challenges that both countries share and should work on together.

      The World's Growing Nuclear Club: India Can Offer Some Lessons on Non-Proliferation in a New Nuclear Age Humphrey Hawksley, Yale Global, April 16, 2007. Humphrey Hawksley examined the world's growing nuclear club. Hawksley believes that many developing states may be tempted by India's success in evading non-proliferation regimes to develop nuclear weapons. With the growing concern over future energy supplies, more states will begin developing nuclear programs and, despite international pressure, will continue to "buck" non-proliferation trends. Hawksley argues that as long as developing nations view the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as unjust, it will remain ineffective .