Brussels …16-17 November 2006
Abstract: In recent years, Pakistan’s legislation and implementation of export controls for sensitive technologies and equipment have undergone a major transformation. These changes took place as a result of a systematic inter-agency process, over several years, and are designed to meet the new challenges in the post-1998 world of overt nuclearisation in South Asia. Despite outreach through diplomatic and other official channels, the general level of understanding in the international community is minimal on Pakistan’s export control systems. Similarly, there exists a need to reduce the gap between practices and perceptions that exists between the nuclear weapon states outside the NPT and the present international nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, given the level of technological interdependence and the problem of organised crime and illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material, it is necessary that all states are committed to strengthening international security . In this context, the Seminar would identify the various initiatives taken by Pakistan to strengthen its export control system and would discuss the experience of implementation and enforcement of export controls by other states, with a view to promoting peaceful uses while limiting proliferation risks.
Conference: Conceptual Framework
The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) since their inception has impacted greatly on the nature of international security and the effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes. This has become more complex as, after the end of the Cold War, the issue of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, on the one hand, and promoting safe and sustainable commerce in the civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the other, have reached a crossroads and sometimes work at cross purposes to each other. ‘Countries of concern’, arguably, and other states/actors (including non-state actors), have added a new dimension to the challenges faced by non-proliferation regimes and by states with nuclear weapons, which are outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 This challenge has been compounded further by the presence of a large number of non-state actors in the international arena, who have been in a position to exploit the loopholes in the system, especially in the existing export control mechanisms, to the detriment of the regime. This has made the work of the NPT more difficult, if not impossible, as proliferation of WMD has found a nexus with organised crime. In this context, ‘Export Controls represent the key elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy.’2
Similarly from the point of view of nuclear states outside the NPT, but which are committed to the norms of the international non-proliferation, the challenge has been enormous. Particularly, as the pace of technological development and transformation in military affairs has made the difference between military and civilian technology less than what might have been faced by other nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states in the past. Furthermore, border controls, organised crime, changed international security scenarios, globalisation and changing yardstick s for defining the norms of non-proliferation have questioned the viability of export control as effective tools designed to stop proliferation of WMD-related technology. The nature of the problem is such that it requires a comprehensive, multilateral response by the international community at large, and non-proliferation regimes specifically. Nevertheless, there is no substitute to the individual efforts made by state parties committed to the international norms on non-proliferation. The efforts made by state parties, especially state parties outside the NPT, is of importance as it helps to fill in those gaps which are present with in the international system.
Pakistan, amongst the nuclear weapons states outside the NPT, has had to deal with the issue of strengthening export controls and the problem of loopholes in the system, both at the national and international levels. Pakistan’s export control experience is unique in the sense that the country has faced challenge and, as a result, chosen to take positive corrective action to improve its existing system. Therefore, as a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons, it has put in place legal and practical arrangements to regulate the transfer of controlled equipment and materials. The export controls experience of Pakistan represents one of the many steps taken by the administration in Pakistan to meet the challenge. Pakistan, as a committed member of the international non-proliferation regime, has taken a policy decision to control the transfer of goods and technology that could contribute to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. This Pakistani experience in the field of developing effective and fail-safe export control measures and practices has faced challenges as it has grappled with the problem of insider-outsider threat and the existence of the international black market. The challenges faced by the unique Pakistani experience have been instructive to the administration and the nuclear policy makers in Islamabad. However, it can contribute greatly to promoting further understanding on the issue of export controls for both Pakistan and the international community. No doubt, the effectiveness of export controls as a tool for limiting the spread of sensitive technologies and materials depends on the cooperation among nations and the multilateral interlocking arrangements to address the spread of weapons of mass destruction, as the nature of the problem is truly global.
The main foci of this Conference are:
This exercise, we believe, will promote peace and security and reduce the risk of international trafficking in the field of WMD, as positions and points of convergence would be sought and debated by Pakistani experts and their counterparts in Europe, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United States, South Korea and other members of the international non-proliferation community, who have similar experiences and face similar problems. The Seminar entitled ‘Pakistan‘s Export Control Experience and the International Context: Current and Future Challenges’ aims to provide an unofficial forum to the policy makers in Pakistan and to the members of international non-proliferation regimes to discuss the issue of export controls and to define the way forward.
The Seminar is organised by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute London, which is an independent think-tank based in the UK, which aims to promote peace and stability in South Asia. It is a two-day International Seminar, due to be held Brussels in the third week of November 2006. The tentative agenda of the Seminar is attached at annex-I. The participants in the Seminar include non-proliferation professionals, researchers, think-tanks, government officials, parliamentarians and others, who may have interest in the non-proliferation matters.
This international Seminar is sponsored by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London UK. The Institute is grateful for the official and unofficial support offered by governments of various countries, e.g., Japan, France, Germany, South Korea, Russian Federation, USA and Pakistan. The Institute also welcomes the participation and support by the European Union, NUPI and SIPRI, ISIS Europe.
Brussels: 16-17 November 2006
Day-I: 16 November 2006
9:30-10:30 AM Registration
10:45-11:00 AM Key Note Address: Gen Ihsahn-Ul-Haq, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee: Pakistan’s Approach towards Non-proliferation, Export Controls and the Ensuing Issues that Affect Pakistan and the Rest of the World. Click here for full speech
Tea Break 11:45-12:00 PM
Session I: Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan’s Experience
12:00-1:00 PM Chair: Dr Alyson Bailes, Director SIPRI
i) Nazir Hussain, Former DG Disarmament, MFA Pakistan, Associate Fellow SASSIL: Pakistan’s Legal Instruments on Export Controls
ii) Khalid Banuri, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan: Command and Control and Ensuing State Structures on Export Controls
Question Answer Session
Lunch 1:00-2:30 PM
Luncheon Address: Pavel Klucký, Chairman of the Zangger Committee; Head, Non-Proliferation & Disarmament Unit, Czech Republic (TBC): The Role of Nuclear Export Controls in Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Preventing its Misuse. Click here for full speech
Question Answer Session
2:30-3:45 PM Chair: Nazir Hussain, Former DG Disarmament, MFA Pakistan and Associate Fellow, SASSIL
i) Annalisa Giannella, HR Solana's Personal Representative on Non-proliferation,.
ii) Li-GenXin, Secretary General, China Arms Control Disarmament Affairs: China’s Export Control Experience
iii) Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA): Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security Action Plan
iv) Anita Nilsson, IAEA: IAEA’s Experience in the Arena of Safety and Security
v) Lars Van Dassen, Director, Non-proliferation Project, Swedish Nuclear Energy Organisation: Sweden’s Nuclear Export Control Experience
Question Answer Session
Tea Break 3:45-4:00 PM
Session III: Strengthening Non-proliferation Regime; Problems and Prospects
4:00-5:30 PM Chair: Klaus Becher, Managing Partner–Knowledge & Analysis LLP.
Conclusion Day I
Conference Dinner: 8:30 PM
DAY-II: 17 November 2006
Registration 9:00-9:30 AM ___
Session IV: Enforcement of Export Controls: Global Experience
09:30-10:45 AM Chair: Owen Greene, Director Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) Bradford University
Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Pakistan’s Experience
Question Answer Session
Tea Break: 10:45-11:00 AM
Session V (Main Session): Enforcement of Export Controls: Global Experience and Best Practices
11.00:12:30-PM Joint Chairs: Sverre Lodgaard,Director NUPI and Maria Sultan, Director, SASSIL:National Practices in Enforcement of Export Control
Panel Discussion: Experts from China, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Russian Federation, South Korea and USA.
Session-VII (Break-up Session): Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation
11:00-12:30 PM Chair: Dr Stephen Pullinger, Executive Director, International Security Information Service, Europe ISIS
i) Dr Zulfiqar Khan Chaudhry, Senior Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan: Safeguards Against Illicit Transfers: Pakistan’s Institutional Response.
ii) Jack Boureston, Managing Director, First Watch International: The Challenges of the Intangible Threat and Export Controls
iii) Kamran Akhtar, Director, Disarmament MFA, Pakistan: Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Pakistan’s Counter Measures.
Question Answer Session
12:45-1:00 PM: Concluding Address: Mr. Rao Sikander Iqbal, Senior Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad (TBC)
Closing Remarks: Maria Sultan, Director, SASSIL: Contribution of New Nuclear Weapon States to International Security
Lunch: 1.15-2.15 PM