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Launch into the Ivy-League G. Bharath , Harsh V. Pant and J. Boureston
Earlier this month, India successfully test fired its nuclear capable Agni-III missile. The indigenously developed two-stage, solid propellant, 16-meter-long missile weighing 48 tonnes validated all the important flight parameters, thus fulfilling its mission objectives in its test of 15 seconds. Indian scientists have for the first time also ratified frontline technology of flex nozzle control system for rocket guidance, specially developed composite propellants and guidance and control with fault tolerant avionics.
With this recent launch, India demonstrated its persistence to develop and possess an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a nuclear-weapon-carrier capability. In fact, Agni’s range can be increased using Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) simulations, thereby giving it an ICBM reach.
India thus joined a select group of nations to field missiles with the capability to hit targets at a distance of 3,500 kilometres with precision. At this stage, India’s ambitions to acquire an ICBM should come as no surprise as it has steadily developed its missile program with a consistent input from its commercial space program. India has also hinted openly at its desire for pursuing its missile program on the sidelines of its commercial space program. For instance, as long back as 1979, Prof. Satish Dhawan had declared that the SLV-3 could be converted into an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which signifies a range of approximately 1500 kilometres.
It would be fair to assume at this juncture that India has sufficient technical expertise to develop an ICBM. Most of the technologies needed to develop an ICBM are not different from that required to launch a satellite into orbit. The key technologies that differ between an ICBM and a satellite launch vehicle are as follows:
These developments show a slow and steady growth in India’s missile program. India has pursued parallel paths in developing both its commercial and military space program. Thus, it is only a matter of time before India possesses an ICBM. However, there are a few technical hurdles to overcome.
India currently possesses two commercial launch vehicles, the PSLV with a solid rocket motor of 138 metric tonnes in its first stage and a liquid rocket engine of 37 tonnes as a second stage. The GSLV configuration is quite similar in its first stage with a solid rocket motor of 125 metric tonnes and a single liquid propellant engine of 37.5 tonnes in its second stage. Thus, pursuing this option could be disadvantageous since both the first stage motors mentioned above are too heavy for an ICBM.
An Indian ICBM could, however, be also built using several liquid propellant engines. But this option is quite impractical in its approach since it would require a lot of time in getting liquid engines re-fuelled and subsequently not suited for quick military launches, if required. Yet, despite a certain technological ambiguity, the recent test and India’s persistence to possess an ICBM signifies India’s view of its missile capability as a strategic necessity, especially in view of India’s pursuit of a “credible minimum” nuclear deterrent.
So far, India’s missile capabilities do not give India a second-strike capability vis-à-vis China. With a range of approximately 3,500 kilometres, however, Agni-III is capable of hitting most parts of the Asian continent and brings almost the whole of Pakistan and some Chinese cities including Shanghai and Beijing within striking distance. Though India has insisted that the missile testing wasn’t country specific or China-centric, India has finally achieved credibility as deterrent against and potential regional enemy. By contrast, one of the most powerful ballistic missiles that China has deployed is the liquid-propelled DF-5. The DF-5 has an estimated range of 12,000 to 15,000 Kms, thus enabling it to threaten the whole of India and also the western portion of the United States. One of the main disadvantages of the DF-5 was that it took a minimum of 30 minutes to fuel. Hence, in the future, it will be replaced by the all-solid DF-31 in order to be suited for quick launches. Because Agni-III is certainly more powerful than any missile in Pakistan’s inventory, it again changes the strategic balance between the two states, something that had been stabilized long ago, with both land and air-based capabilities. Even so, Pakistan possesses sufficient deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis India and has also its eyes fixed in solid-propelled missiles, a common characteristic amongst nations aspiring to bolster their missile capability, and its Ghaznavi is based on Chinese-supplied M-11 missiles. Most recently, in March 2007, the testing of the Babur land attack cruise missile (LACM), which has an extended range of 700 km by Pakistan, has sufficient capabilities to accurately hit Indian missile deployment sites within range thus introducing the possibility of Pakistan initiating a pre-emptive strike. With the Agni-III, however, India will be able to deploy its strategic forces beyond the range of Pakistan’s most accurate system
India’s technological prowess and its ambitions to emerge as a major power in the international system have been driving it toward the acquisition of an ICBM capability for some time now. The reported success in the recent launch indicates that India may be swiftly filling in the technological gaps, which are required for it to have an efficient and a stable ICBM capability. However, the technological success doesn’t necessarily reflect a political will, which is required for it to reach the ivy-league of missile capable states.
[G. Bharath and J. Boureston are visiting fellows at the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, London. Harsh V. Pant teaches at King’s College London.]
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