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Annual Conference

of

The South Asian Strategic Stability Institute


Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan’s Export Control Experience
Current and Future Challenges and Options

Bruxelles September 16 & 17 2006

Abstract: In recent years, Pakistan’s legislation and implementation of export controls for sensitive technologies and equipment have undergone a major transformation. These changes took place as a result of a systematic inter-agency process, over several years, and are designed to meet the new challenges in the post-1998 world of overt nuclearisation in South Asia. Despite outreach through diplomatic and other official channels, the general level of understanding in the international community is minimal on Pakistan’s export control systems. Similarly, there is a need to reduce the gap between practices and perceptions that exists between the nuclear weapon states outside the NPT and the present international nuclear non-proliferation regime.  However, given the level of technological interdependence and the problem of organised  crime and  illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material, it is necessary that all states are committed to strengthening international security. In this context, the Seminar would identify the various initiatives taken by Pakistan to strengthen its export control system and would discuss the experience of  implementation and enforcement of export controls by other states, with a view to promoting peaceful uses while limiting proliferation risks.

Conference: Conceptual Framework

Since their inception, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has impacted greatly on the nature of international security and the effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes. This has become more complex as, after the end of the Cold War, the issue of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, on the one hand, and promoting safe and sustainable commerce in the civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the other, have reached a crossroads and sometimes work at cross purposes to each other.  ‘Countries of concern’, arguably, and other states/actors (including non-state actors), have added a new dimension to the challenges faced by non-proliferation regimes and by states with nuclear weapons, which are outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 This challenge has been compounded further by the presence of a large number of non-state actors in the international arena, who have been in a position to exploit the loopholes in the system, especially in the existing export control mechanisms, to the detriment of the regime. This has made the work of the NPT more difficult, if not impossible, as proliferation of WMD has found a nexus with organised crime. In this context, ‘Export Controls represent the key elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy.’2

Similarly from the point of view of nuclear states which are outside the NPT but are committed to the norms of international non-proliferation, the challenge has been enormous, particularly, as the pace of technological development and transformation in military affairs has made the difference between military and civilian technology less than what might have been faced by other nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states in the past.  Furthermore, border controls, organised crime, changed international security scenarios, globalisation and changing yardsticks for defining the norms of non-proliferation have questioned the viability of export controls as effective tools designed to stop proliferation of WMD-related technology.  The nature of the problem is such that it requires a comprehensive, multilateral response by the international community at large, and non-proliferation regimes specifically. Nevertheless, there is no substitute for the individual efforts made by state parties committed to the international norms on non-proliferation. The efforts made by state parties, especially state parties outside the NPT, is of importance as it helps to fill in those gaps which are present within the international system.

Pakistan, amongst the nuclear weapons states outside the NPT, has had to deal with the issue of strengthening export controls and the problem of loopholes in the system, both at the national and international levels.  Pakistan’s export control experience is unique in the sense that the country has faced several challenges and, as a result, chosen to take positive corrective action to improve its existing system. Therefore, as a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons, Pakistan has put in place legal and practical arrangements to regulate the transfer of controlled equipment and materials. The export controls experience of Pakistan represents one of the many steps taken by the administration in Pakistan to meet the challenge. As a committed member of the international non-proliferation regime, Pakistan, has taken a policy decision to control the transfer of goods and technology that could contribute to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. This Pakistani experience in the field of developing effective and fail-safe export control measures and practices has faced challenges as it has grappled with the problem of insider-outsider threat and the existence of the international black market. The challenges faced by the unique Pakistani experience have been instructive to the administration and the nuclear policy-makers in Islamabad.  These challenges, however, can contribute greatly to promoting further understanding on the issue of export controls for both Pakistan and the international community. Without a doubt, the effectiveness of export controls as a tool for limiting the spread of sensitive technologies and materials depends on the cooperation among nations and the multilateral interlocking arrangements to address the spread of weapons of mass destruction, as the nature of the problem is truly global.

Scott. A. Jones, ‘Current and Future Challenges for Asian Non-proliferation Export Control’, East Asian Review, Vol 15, (Summer 2003), pp.3-26.

Ibid., p.4.

Main Foci

The main foci of this Conference are:

  1. To review and share what Pakistan has done and achieved in the sphere of export controls and their relevance to the international effort to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  2. The global experience in export controls. 
  3. The efforts being made to bridge the gap that exists between states possessing nuclear weapons outside the NPT and non-proliferation so that a way forward can be sought.

This exercise, we believe, will promote peace and security and reduce the risk of international trafficking in the field of WMD, as positions and points of convergence would be sought and debated by Pakistani experts and their counterparts in Europe, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United States, South Korea and other members of the international non-proliferation community, who have similar experiences and face similar problems. The Seminar entitled ‘Pakistan‘s Export Control Experience and the International Context: Current and Future Challenges’ aims to provide an unofficial forum to the policy makers in Pakistan and to the members of  international non-proliferation regimes to discuss the issue of export controls and to define the way forward.

The Seminar is organised by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute London, which is an independent think-tank based in the UK, which aims to promote peace and stability in South Asia.  It is a two-day international seminar, due to be held Brussels in the third week of November 2006. The tentative agenda of the Seminar is attached as Annexure-I. The participants in the Seminar include non-proliferation professionals, researchers, think-tanks, government officials, parliamentarians and others, who have an interest in non-proliferation issues.

Conference Sponsors

This international seminar is sponsored by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London UK. The Institute is grateful for the official and unofficial support offered by governments of various countries, e.g., Japan, France, Germany, South Korea, Russian Federation, USA and Pakistan. The Institute also welcomes the participation and support by the European Union, NUPI and SIPRI.

Scott. A. Jones, ‘Current and Future Challenges for Asian Non-proliferation Export Control’, East Asian Review, Vol 15, (Summer 2003), pp.3-26.

Ibid, p.4

Programme

Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan’s Experience

Current and Future Challenges & Options

Brussels: 16-17 November 2006
Venue: Residence Palace

DAY I: 16th November 2006

9:30-10:30 AM                         Registration

Inaugural Session

10:30-10:45 AM           Welcome Address: Maria Sultan, Director, SASSIL 

10:45-11:00 AM           Key Note Address: Gen Ehsan-Ul-Haq, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee: Pakistan’s Approach towards Non-proliferation, Export Controls and the Ensuing Issues that Affect Pakistan and the Rest of the World

11:45-12:00 PM           Tea Break

Session I            Strengthened Export Controls:  Pakistan’s Experience

12:00-1:00 PM     Chair: Dr Alyson Bailes, Director SIPRI

i) Nazir Hussain, Former DG Disarmament, MFA Pakistan, Associate Fellow SASSIL: Pakistan’s Legal Instruments on Export Controls

ii) Khalid Banuri, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan: Command and Control and Ensuing State Structures on Export Controls

Question Answer Session

1:00-2:30 PM       Lunch

Luncheon Address: Pavel Klucký, Chairman of the Zangger Committee; Head, Non-Proliferation & Disarmament Unit, Czech Republic (TBC): The Role of Nuclear Export Controls in Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Preventing its Misuse

Question and Answer Session

Session-II:          Challenges of Export Controls and the International Context

2:30-3:45 PM    Chair:    Nazir Hussain, Former DG Disarmament, MFA Pakistan and Associate Fellow, SASSIL

i) Annalisa Giannella, HR Solana's Personal Representative on Non-proliferation, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union: EU’s Export Control Experience                             

ii) Li-GenXin, Secretary General, China Arms Control Disarmament Affairs: China’s Export Control Experience

iii) Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA): Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security Action Plan

iv)  Anita Nilsson, IAEA: IAEA’s Experience in the Arena of Safety and Security

v)  Lars Van Dassen, Director, Non-proliferation Project, Swedish Nuclear Energy Organisation: Sweden’s Nuclear Export Control Experience

Question and Answer Session

3:45-4:00 PM       Tea Break

Session III:  Strengthening Non-proliferation Regime; Problems and Prospects

4:00-5:30 PM       Chair: Klaus Becher, Managing Partner, Knowledge & Analysis, LLP.

i) Mr Pervaiz Butt, Secretary, Science and Technology: Pakistan’s Nuclear Needs and Future Options

ii) Poong Eil Juhn, Special Advisor, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute: Korean Nuclear Programmes and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

iii) Shahbaz Hussain, Ambassador of Pakistan to Austria and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the IAEA: Pakistan’s WMD Policy    

iv) Sverre Lodgaard, Director, NUPI, Oslo: Three State Solution

v) Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant-Secretary-General for WMD Policy, NATO

Conclusion Day I

8:30 PM                     Conference Dinner:

Special Keynote Address:  Werner Bauwens, Directorate for Foreign Policy and Common Security, Defence and Disarmament, Ministry of   Foreign Affairs, Belgium.


DAY II: 17th November 2006

9:00-9:30 AM           Registration                        ___                        

Session IV:       Enforcement of Export Controls: Global Experience

09:30-10:45 AM       Chair: Owen Greene, Director, Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) Bradford University

i) Syed Arif Ahmad, Director, Directorate of Safety, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission: Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Pakistan’s Experience

ii) Dr. Sibylle Bauer, EU Rep., Non-Proliferation and Export Control Project - SIPRI, Stockholm: EU Enforcement Mechanism

iii) Zawar Abidi, SPD, Pakistan: Enforcement Provisions in Pakistan’s Export Control Legal Framework.

iv) Andreas Persbox, Nuclear Law and Policy Researcher, VERTIC: Export Control and the Loopholes in the Enforcement Mechanism

Question and Answer Session

10:45-11:00 AM       Tea Break

Session V     Main Session: Enforcement of Export Controls: Global Experience and Best Practices

11.00:12:30-PM      Joint Chairs: Sverre Lodgaard, Director NUPI and Maria Sultan, Director, SASSIL:National Practices in Enforcement of Export Control

Panel Discussion: Experts from China, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Russian Federation, South Korea and USA.

Session-VI           Break-up Session: Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation

11:00-12:30 PM     Chair:  Dr Stephen Pullinger, Executive Director, International Security Information Service, Europe ISIS

i) Dr Zulfiqar Khan Chaudhry, Senior Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan: Safeguards Against Illicit Transfers: Pakistan’s Institutional Response.

ii) Jack Boureston, Managing Director, First Watch International: The Challenges of the Intangible Threat and Export Controls

iii) Kamran Akhtar, Director, Disarmament MFA, Pakistan: Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Pakistan’s Counter Measures.

IV) Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London:  Global action needed to stop nuclear proliferation

Question and Answer Session

12:45-1:00 PM:        Concluding Session

Concluding Address: Mr. Rao Sikander Iqbal, Senior Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence,

Islamabad (TBC)

Closing Remarks: Maria Sultan, Director, SASSIL: Contribution of New Nuclear Weapon States to International Security

1.15-2.15 PM:          Lunch

Conference End

   

 

Director: Ms. Maria Sultan
maria.sultan@sassu.org.uk

Programme Manager: Mr Nick Robson
nick.robson@sassu.org.uk

Tel no: 0845 003 0864