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Another Step in From the Cold
By
Anne-Charlotte Merrell Wetterwik Center for International Trade & Security at the University of Georgia, USA (CITS/UGA).
How can a country with a troubled non-proliferation past restore its damaged reputation and once again be considered a responsible partner in the international community? Since news of the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network broke early in 2003, few have associated Pakistan with a sound export control system. But Pakistan has made important, though largely unnoticed, changes in the last three years. A new export control act was adopted in 2004 and a new list of controlled items followed in 2005. Pakistan thereby launched an ambitious agenda for further improvements in its export control procedures. Most recently, on April 30, 2007 Pakistani authorities announced the establishment of a national export control authority - SECDIV (Strategic Export Control Division) under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In addition to improved governmental tools for export controls, more information and outreach on the Pakistani nonproliferation system have been announced. In November 2006, a conference on Pakistani export control policy was organized in Brussels on a Pakistani initiative. At this initial conference, export control officials and scholars from Pakistan and the international community gathered for a round of frank discussions. The initiative has been followed up by a similar event in Islamabad in January 2007, and more events are currently being planned. With a new agenda, stronger legal instruments, enhanced institutions and a willingness to share information with the international community, Pakistan has taken another important step in from the cold.
Technical, political and economical changes influence the world’s proliferation concerns and responses. Also, the actors change over time. Pakistan re-enters a changed international environment and has a role to play today that is very different from yesterday. The 20th century saw a wide range of initiatives aimed at halting the spread of items and technologies that could be used for weapons of mass destruction, while still allowing legitimate civilian trade. As a strong advocate of the United Nations, Pakistan has been an active participant in a majority of these initiatives, but has sometimes chosen a different path. The Geneva Protocol (1925), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (1975) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) are all aimed at building a strong non-proliferation foundation. However, they have neither prevented the advent of new nuclear states, nor stopped the use of chemical weapons. Even when non-proliferation treaties, conventions and arrangements obtain near-universal adherence, they do not guarantee complete non-proliferation “success.” Export controls have been a way to deal with reality. However, the multilateral export control measures have proven invaluable in setting the international norms that today are increasingly accepted and implemented by both regime members and non-members.
The Cold War saw the birth of export control on a multilateral scale with the establishment in 1950 of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (COCOM) - a Western, US-led attempt at preventing the USSR and the Warsaw Pact from obtaining sensitive technology. COCOM did not have a global focus, as the scope of countries interested in the controlled technology was limited. However, COCOM introduced the idea of modern, multilateral dual-use export controls as an additional safety net – an idea that has been debated, criticized and replicated ever since. Each of the five multilateral export control regimes in existence today was created after serious breaches in the international non-proliferation system. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group came into being in 1974 after the first Indian nuclear test and the Australia Group sprang from discovering the use of chemical weapons in the wake of the Iran/Iraq war. Still, some countries claim to have had their legitimate trade interests foiled by the multilateral export control regimes. Several non-members have characterized the regimes as cartels, created in secret meetings in the industrialized world; cartels aimed at keeping less fortunate, but rapidly developing countries at bay economically. As a country with a strong interest in rapid technological development, particularly in the energy sector, Pakistan has on occasion voiced strong criticism towards the regimes. Regime members on the other hand, have seen their work as a necessary and responsible reaction in a world where treaties and conventions are disregarded, sensitive technology is readily available and tension between countries some times runs the risk of escalating into nuclear Armageddon. For many years, representatives from both sides of regime membership have tried in vain to advocate their perspectives. Then on a crisp sunny day in September 2001, 19 men equipped with box cutters boarded four planes and forever changed the global threat perspective.
Countries will continue to have different threat perceptions, but global terrorism has brought a new dimension to the international debate. It has exposed the need and opportunity for a new direction in global strategic cooperation. Pakistan finds itself in the epicenter of the issue with a new security relationship with the United States and other countries, geographical proximity to some of the most challenging security dilemmas and a new commitment to put its house in order after the A.Q. Khan episode. Pakistan, despite not being a member of any regime and as a former critic, now embraces a wider range of concepts supporting a stronger non-proliferation system. Pakistan as recently as March 2007 indicated its interaction with two of the multilateral export control regimes – NSG and MTCR. When the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004, the international community paved the way for a new global perspective on non-proliferation. Directed toward battling terrorism, the resolution contains a distinct export control component. UNSCR 1540 is the first attempt at promoting global adherence to a number of export control principles and thereby aligning the necessary tools for non-proliferation to a new reality. The UN resolutions following in its wake – UNSCR 1673, 1718 and 1737 - further solidify the notions that export control procedures have taken on a global dimension. Pakistan has supported these efforts and has submitted its reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee.
The end of the Cold War opened up the existing regimes to countries from the Warsaw pact and promoted a new type of dialogue with former adversaries. Outreach and promotion of export control ideals have replaced the perception of the multilateral regimes as being closed and secretive organizations. More information is available today and countries’ understanding of export control and why it is a necessary instrument to adopt has improved. To pursue a more comprehensive and solid international export control system, the multilateral regimes need to further expand their outreach efforts. In that endeavor new concepts and dialogues need to be considered. Universal membership to the regimes is not feasible or desired, but adherence to the important export control principles should be promoted. The adoption of UNSCR 1540 brings a global perspective to the international export control community that needs to be further elaborated and consolidated. As a natural evolution of the multilateral export control regimes UNSCR 1540 addresses a changed world and sets the stage for improved international dialogue. The grandfathers of export control need to have an open discussion with the globalized generation - to reevaluate the threat, to listen to new perspectives and to pass on the lessons of 50 years of remarkably effective export controls.
Countries are seldom judged by their words but rather by their actions. This is why the Pakistani steps toward stronger legal instruments, enhanced institutions and further transparency are commendable. Sharing information and solutions to the difficult challenge of building and implementing a comprehensive export control system is the right way to move forward in re-building Pakistan’s record on non-proliferation. The next steps Pakistan takes to further strengthen its national export control system and how it addresses remaining questions will be very important and interesting to follow. Pakistan has proven that it wants to be taken seriously in the field of non-proliferation. It is time to pay attention.
Anne-Charlotte Merrell Wetterwik is a Research Associate at the Center for International Trade & Security at the University of Georgia, USA (CITS/UGA). Ms Merrell Wetterwik specializes in analysis of national export control systems, the export control system within the European Union and leads CITS/UGA project on improved cooperation between non-governmental experts in the field of non-proliferation and export control. She could be reached at: a.wetterwik@cits.uga.edu
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